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Abstract
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment,
structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional
variation exists in SPACs’ performance, which can be explained by the strong
implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for ac-
quisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions
with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with
market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors’ involvement
in the merged firm’s governance improves long-term performance. This evidence
has important implications given SPACs’ high popularity in recent years and
the new PE industry’s trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising.
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1. Introduction
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are blank-check companies
that have no operations but go public with the intention of merging with or
acquiring a company with the proceeds of the SPAC’s initial public offering
(IPO) of shares. Since 2003, SPACs have raised more than $31 billion in U.S.5
markets. They have represented a significant proportion of IPOs, especially
in the years leading up to the 2007–2009 financial crisis, reaching more than
one-third of U.S. IPO volume in 2007 (See Fig. 1). This paper studies the
performance of SPACs and how incentives created by the contractual features
of SPACs [some of which bear a strong resemblance to that of private equity10
(PE)] affect their performance.
[Insert Fig. 1 near here]
I find that, on average, SPACs perform extremely poorly, whether measured
by long-run stock abnormal returns or operating performance. The average
four-year buy-and-hold return following the SPAC IPO is -51.9%, compared15
with an average return of 8.5% for all other companies that became public
in the year of the SPAC IPO. Moreover, considerable cross-sectional variation
exists in the degree to which SPACs destroy value with their acquisitions. I find
strong evidence that much of SPAC value destruction through bad acquisitions
is a result of certain contractual features that give SPAC managers incentives to20
pursue any acquisition over no acquisition. For instance, performance is worse
when deals are completed just before the contractually specified deadline for a
SPAC acquisition. This finding suggests that, as the deadline approaches, SPAC
managers become desperate to do any acquisition, even a bad one, to avoid
missing the deadline and having to liquidate the SPAC. Along the same lines,25
performance is worse if the deal just barely meets the contractually specified
minimum transaction value. In addition, I find that performance is worse when
SPAC IPO underwriter fees are deferred and paid upon a SPAC’s successful
merger completion, suggesting that underwriters with an interest in a deal being
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completed, regardless of its quality, are more likely to pitch bad deals to SPAC30
sponsors.
I also find that increasing SPAC sponsors’ ownership is detrimental to per-
formance and that appointing one of the sponsors as a chairman in the merged
company improves it. Finally, evidence from the accounting performance, using
measures such as operating margins and return on sales, further confirms that35
SPAC acquisitions significantly under-perform various benchmarks and that the
poor operating performance of SPACs does not appear to be caused by higher
leverage and financial distress costs. In summary, while the average investor in
SPAC acquisitions incurs large losses in the long run, the perverse incentives of
SPACs cause some investors to lose more than others.40
My results are important because they provide evidence of the detrimen-
tal effects of SPAC structure on sponsors to pursue a bad acquisition instead
of no acquisition. The results also relate to the PE industry, as some of the
structural features and implicit incentives that affect SPAC performance are
some of the most important hallmarks of the traditional private equity contract45
(Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2013).2 Above all, the evidence from this paper
is especially relevant given the recent trend in the PE industry toward alterna-
tive, more transparent, and more flexible structures of investment. Although
the PE industry has survived the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, it is cur-
rently undergoing significant changes and increased regulation, in the wake of50
public demand, media scrutiny, and government pressure. The use of alterna-
tive structures and asset classes is becoming more common as limited partners
explore options beyond the traditional ten-year blind pool fund. Moreover, the
2For instance, both forms of investment have a finite life: two years for SPACs and typically
ten years for a traditional PE. Also, the managerial compensation in both cases is incentive-
driven. SPAC managers obtain 20% of the initial equity raised only upon successful merger
completion, and PE managers are awarded 20% of the gains only upon successful exit. In
addition, while SPAC sponsors are required to spend at least 80% of the money raised on a
given target, PE investors are restricted on the amount of fund capital that can be used on a
given deal.
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deal-by-deal model of fund-raising (whereby investors are presented investment
opportunities and can either opt in or opt out on a case-by-case basis, without55
having to lock up their money for a ten-year period) was recently selected by
investors as one of the most popular forms of tailor-made funds (see Fig. 2).3
However, while tough fund-raising conditions and market dynamics are likely
to stimulate the growth of alternative PE structures, unless these structures are
designed to align the interests of managers and investors, they may not always60
be optimal.
[Insert Fig. 2 near here]
The literature on SPACs is limited compared with the importance of SPAC
deals. Researchers have overlooked the richness of empirical data that SPACs’
public disclosures offer and the unique form of SPACs (public form of private65
equity) that can be used to shed more light on the classic PE contract. The
few papers that have studied them have mainly described their specific struc-
ture characteristics and legal implications. For instance, Heyman (2007) illus-
trates some of the important features of SPACs, and Rodrigues and Stegemoller
(2013) point out the legal differences between SPACs and private equity funds.70
Sjostrom (2008) compares SPAC characteristics with those of blank-check com-
panies that are involved in reverse mergers, while Rodrigues and Stegemoller
(2014) compare them with traditional IPOs. Berger (2008) underlines the in-
creasing popularity of SPACs and highlights the various motives that lead pri-
vate targets to pursue an acquisition by a SPAC. Other recent papers examine75
the determinants of SPAC merger approvals (Cumming et al., 2014; Lakice-
vic et al., 2013). Papers also highlight the conflicts of interest inherent in the
SPAC structure (Jog and Sun, 2007), the role that SPAC managers play in the
approval of value-destroying acquisitions (Jenkinson and Sousa, 2011), and the
relation between SPACs governance and ownership and their short- and long-80
3For additional discussion and analysis of the recent shifts in the business model of private
equity, see Jacobides and Saaverda (2015).
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run performance (Howe and O’Brien, 2012). However, because these are some
of the earliest empirical papers on the topic, their cross-sectional multivariate
analyses are restricted because of their small sample size. Finally, Lakicevic
and Vulanovic (2013) examine the return patterns of different SPAC securities,
Lewellen (2009) compares SPAC returns with those of private equity funds, and85
Tran (2010), whose paper is probably the closest to this study, compares the
short-term performance of acquisitions by SPAC bidders with other acquisitions.
In this paper, I begin by examining the short-term performance of SPAC
deals, differentiating between deal type (completed versus withdrawn). While
Tran (2010) examines all deal announcements and finds positive abnormal per-90
formance observed around the acquisition announcement, I show that this posi-
tive effect is driven only by the completed deals.4 I then examine the long-term
stock and operating performance for up to five years following the SPAC IPO.
In contrast to Howe and O’Brien (2012), who also study SPACs’ long-term stock
performance, I collect all governance, ownership, and control variables from the95
definitive proxy statement [Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form
DEFM 14A] between the SPAC and the target, not from the SPAC IPO prospec-
tus. While the IPO prospectus reports important information about the SPAC
following its IPO, Form DEFM 14A contains additional information relating
to the governance, ownership, and compensation of the combined company fol-100
lowing the completion of the merger. I measure long-term performance from
the date of SPAC IPO, not from the merger vote date. Setting the end date
of the holding period relative to the merger vote date means that the holding
periods are different for each SPAC and, thus, the returns are not comparable.
I use a fixed holding period that is uniform across all SPACs. I adjust the105
short- and long-term returns for the market performance, instead of using raw
4One-third of the SPAC deals in Tran’s sample are later withdrawn and are never com-
pleted. Further, while the time to acquisition announcement is included in his regression
analysis of short-term performance, he allows for linearity only in the relation between time
and performance, while I find that the relation is in fact nonlinear.
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returns. This adjustment removes the effect that market timing might have on
performance. Finally, I perform multivariate analyses controlling for the effect
of various important factors instead of relying only on univariate tests. This is
the main contribution of the paper, as I introduce additional factors related to110
the conflicts of interest between various parties (including sponsors, target in-
siders, and SPAC IPO underwriters) involved in the deal, ownership structure,
and corporate governance of the merged firms and show that they have signif-
icant explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in the performance of
SPAC acquisitions.115
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
SPAC transactions in more detail. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the
sample. Section 4 analyses the short- and long-term performance, as well as the
operating performance, of the companies. Section 5 presents the cross-sectional
variation in performance. Section 6 concludes.120
2. Description of SPAC transactions
2.1. The acquirer
A SPAC is a blank-check company formed to raise funds in a public stock
offering for the sole purpose of purchasing an operating business. A SPAC is
typically established by a small group of experienced managers (the sponsors),125
who rely mainly on their reputation to raise capital by creating a publicly traded
shell company and offering shares in the shell company to investors via an IPO.
The IPO is structured as a sale of units consisting of both common stock and
in-the-money warrants, which cannot be exercised until the SPAC completes an
acquisition. Usually, the common shares and warrants are decoupled from the130
units, and they are traded separately after the IPO has been completed.
Upon the completion of the IPO, a minimum of 85% of the net proceeds of
the offering are placed in an escrow or trust account, invested in low-risk U.S.
government securities, until the SPAC’s management makes an acquisition.5
5SEC Rule 419 requires a blank-check company to hold 90% of the net IPO proceeds in
6
These funds are released upon the earlier of the completion of a business com-135
bination or the liquidation of the SPAC. The management is typically allowed
to use the remainder of the proceeds that are not held in the trust as well as a
predetermined fraction of the interest earned on the trust account to cover ad-
ministrative expenses, fees, and working capital. The costs of due diligence on
prospective targets, as well as the costs of negotiation, structuring, and gaining140
shareholder approval for the merger, are paid from this money.
SPAC managers are not granted a salary or other cash compensation.6 They
commonly receive a 20% interest in the SPAC, which is usually purchased in a
private placement executed prior to the IPO. They may also purchase heavily
discounted warrants through a private placement around the time of the IPO.145
If a deal is made, the 20% share of the founders becomes very valuable. If
the SPAC liquidates without having completed an acquisition, the shares and
warrants owned by the sponsors end up worthless. Sponsors do not receive
any of the liquidation proceeds if a deal is not made. This situation, in effect,
creates an extremely strong economic incentive for the founders of the SPAC to150
complete an acquisition prior to the SPAC’s expiration date.
an escrow or trust account until it completes an acquisition. While earlier SPACs tended to
put 85% in trust, the new generation SPACs are placing between 95% and 100% in the trust
account (Rodrigues and Stegemoller, 2013).
6SPAC managers are allowed to use a maximum of 15% of the IPO proceeds for work-
ing capital. Examining IPO prospectuses, I find that SPAC managers commonly allocate a
standard amount of $180,000 to cover their administrative expenses over the two-year pe-
riod. Furthermore, the money is usually being paid to a company that is affiliated to either
one or more of the SPAC sponsors. I also find that a significant portion of the rest of the
proceeds (that are being allocated for working capital) is used by the SPAC sponsors to pay
for director and officer liability insurance premiums. When I study the relation between the
size of the insurance premiums they buy and the stock market reaction to the acquisition
announcement, I find a significantly negative relation between the two. SPACs with sponsors
that insure themselves with higher premiums against potential future lawsuits are perceived
to make lower quality deals (Lin et al., 2011).
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2.2. The acquisition
The founders normally have only 18 months from the date of the IPO to
make an acquisition, plus a six-month grace period if a deal is announced but
not completed by then. If the SPAC does not acquire a target firm within155
the maximum period of two years, the company is required to liquidate and
the escrowed IPO proceeds are distributed pro rata to holders of IPO shares
(Savitz, 2005).
Given the time pressure and the strong incentives of the sponsors of the
SPAC to close an acquisition within the fixed time frame, the process of finding160
a suitable target starts immediately after the IPO and, in many cases, involves
the consideration of a large number of potential target candidates (Tran, 2010).
Although SPAC sponsors usually do not have a target company in mind at the
time of the IPO, they do, based on their particular expertise, typically have a
specific industry or geographic region of interest for their future acquisition.165
Another important characteristic of the SPAC is that it must spend at least
80% of its net assets on the business combination to avoid liquidation. While
in some rare cases SPACs attempt to acquire multiple targets at the same time,
the most common approach is the acquisition of a single target. Nevertheless,
the fact that SPACs must spend 80% of the invested money on the deal, a fact170
of which the target’s own management and owners are well aware, could lead
SPAC sponsors to overpay for the target company.
SPACs also rely on the advice of investment bankers, private equity profes-
sionals, lawyers, and business owners. For instance, in many cases, the SPAC
IPO underwriters become the company’s advisers during the acquisition nego-175
tiation process. Underwrites have incentives to engage in the merger process
because a portion of their IPO underwriting fees is usually deferred and paid
only upon the successful completion of a business combination by the SPAC.
In other words, if a SPAC fails to make an acquisition, the underwriters re-
ceive only a fraction of their total fee. While this in effect leads to high initial180
trust values (lower immediate underwriting fees are subtracted at the time of
the IPO), it also creates a strong incentive for the underwriters to push for any
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potential target and to close a merger on time.
SPAC shareholders are allowed to vote on a proposed business combination,
even though such approval may not be required under state law.7 A proposed185
acquisition is approved by the share holders if (1) a majority of shareholders
vote to approve the transaction and (2) a substantial percentage of shareholders
(typically 60%–80%) agree not to redeem their shares for the pro rata trust value
on the date of the shareholder vote. In other words, if more than a specified
percentage (the conversion threshold) of SPAC investors cashed out their shares190
from the trust fund (typically 20%), the acquisition would not go forward. The
two conditions must be satisfied for the acquisition to be approved. External
shareholders who vote against a proposed acquisition are entitled to redeem
their common stock in return for a pro rata share of the value held in trust if
the acquisition is ultimately approved. The shareholders who choose to redeem195
their shares are allowed to keep or exercise their warrants, or both, irrespective
of their voting decision.
2.3. The target
The SPAC may be an attractive way for private companies to obtain access
to additional capital without having to do an IPO on their own. The target200
companies acquired by a SPAC avoid the lengthy process of doing a traditional
IPO, as they are not required to supply the detailed financial statements and
other disclosures that usually accompany initial public offerings (see Sjostrom,
2008). In addition, they save on the extremely high costs associated with the
traditional IPO underwriting process (Loughran and Ritter, 2002).8205
7Most acquirers’ shareholders are allowed to vote on stock-for-stock acquisitions only if the
expected equity dilution factor from the business combination exceeds 20% (Hsieh and Wang,
2008). SPAC investors are in fact given two votes–one on the proposed acquisition and one
on whether they want to withdraw their money from the fund.
8Although uncommon, a SPAC acquirer could buy a publicly traded company. Nine percent
of all announced acquisitions involve public targets. I also check whether some of the deals
involve targets that have previously tried and failed to undergo an IPO. I find only four deals
of previously withdrawn IPOs, largely because of poor market conditions.
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Given their large cash reserves, SPACs may also be appealing to target
companies with owners that prefer to cash out. By allowing the company to be
purchased by a SPAC, target insiders gain liquidity without having to sell their
shares via a traditional IPO.9 Similarly, SPACs may be used by private equity
firms as an exit vehicle of their portfolio companies.210
Target companies may value not only the access to additional capital but also
the benefit they receive from the expertise of the SPAC’s management team. A
SPAC is formed by a group of people who are usually experts in a given industry
and have demonstrated a track record of success and a proprietary edge in the
areas of private equity and mergers and acquisitions.10215
3. Sample selection and sample characteristics
I gather data on SPAC acquisitions from a variety of sources. To identify
the sample, I employ a list of all SPACs that successfully completed an IPO and
match it with a list of all announced (completed and withdrawn) acquisitions
by a SPAC acquirer over the period 2004–2010. The main data on the firms are220
obtained from Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum and Thomson ONE
Banker [IPO data and merger and acquisition (M&A) data], the Center for
Research in Security Prices and Bloomberg (stock price data), and Compustat
(accounting data). I obtain further data from S–1 (prospectuses), DEFM 14A
(proxy statements), and 10-K (annual reports) by searching the SEC filings in225
the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.
Table 1 lists the completed acquisitions by SPACs included in my analysis, in
9For instance, exiting of the target’s owners through an IPO may be less plausible given
that most IPOs feature share lockup agreements, which prevent insiders and other pre-IPO
shareholders from selling any of their shares for a specified period immediately after the IPO
(typically 180 days) (Field and Hanka, 2001).
10Services Acquisition Corp. is an example of a SPAC with a high-profile management that
includes former executives from Blockbuster, AutoNation, and Boca Resorts. The SPAC that
has received perhaps the most media attention of all is Acquicor Technology Inc., formed by
former Apple executives Steve Wozniak, Gil Amelio, and Ellen Hancock.
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chronological order of their respective S–1 dates. Table 2 shows the distribution
of SPAC IPOs and M&A transactions that successfully completed an acquisition
within the fixed time frame and the distribution of SPACs that were liquidated230
because they were unable to complete an acquisition, either because they have
reached the two-year deadline or because they have not managed to obtain the
required shareholders’ approval. The first IPO transaction took place in 2003,
the bulk of the deals that entered the sample occurred in 2005 and 2007, and only
six SPACs that went public in 2008 and completed an acquisition within the next235
two years are included in my sample. The distribution of completed acquisitions
made by a SPAC acquirer over time shows that only two acquisitions took place
in the first two years, 2004 and 2005, and that most of the deals are completed
between 2007 and 2009. The difference in distributions between columns 2 and
3 of Table 2 gives some indication that a variation exists between SPACs in240
the time it takes them to complete an acquisition. Table 2 also shows that a
significant portion of SPACs are being liquidated (approximately 39% of the
SPACs in my sample announced an acquisition that was later withdrawn).
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 near here]
Table 3 contains the industry composition of the target firms. A significant245
industry variation seems to exist in the target companies. The total sample
of 73 targets being acquired by SPACs is spread over 31 industries. Fifteen
targets are in business services; six, in holding and other investment offices;
five, in engineering, accounting, research, management, and related services;
and five, in communications. The remainder of the deals are distributed over250
27 industries with a maximum of three targets coming from the same industry.
Apparently, SPACs are not limited to a particular industry and they complete
acquisitions with target companies from numerous industries.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
Table 4 contains summary statistics of all completed acquisitions. The av-255
erage (median) deal value of an acquisition by a SPAC is $275.7 million ($141.2
11
million). Based on the SPAC trading price at the time of the merger announce-
ment, the average (median) market capitalization of acquirers is $153.1 million
($73.4 million). The average (median) relative size, computed as the ratio of
target value over market capitalization of the acquirer, is 1.907 (1.610). This260
implies that, on average, SPACs tend to purchase targets that are 1.9 times
bigger. The financing required to pay for these larger deals is usually obtained
by issuing additional equity or debt at the time of the acquisition.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
The SPAC sponsors, on average, collectively own approximately 11% of the265
shares of the new merged company, and they hold 34% of the board seats of the
sample firms upon the merger completion. Although sponsors are commonly
awarded 20% of the SPAC shares, their ownership may vary depending on the
method of payment used in the acquisition (cash versus stock) and whether they
bought additional shares in the stock market. In addition, the chief executive270
office (CEO) comes from the SPAC sponsors in 30% of the cases; the chairman,
52% of the cases. This evidence suggests a substantial involvement by the
SPAC sponsors at least in the initial operations of the newly merged companies.
Sponsors did not receive any shares from only two companies in the sample and
did not obtain any board representation from only five companies.11 The shares275
received by the sponsors represent the bulk of their compensation for their effort
in finding a suitable target.
The target insiders own an average (median) 24.7% (21.6%) of the company
after the acquisition. They supply about one-third of the directors of the new
company. A target insider is elected as a CEO of the new company in 66% of280
the cases and as a chairman in 45% of the cases. Significant variation exists
in the level of post-acquisition ownership of target insiders, which is consistent
11The ownership structure (sponsors, target insiders, and institutional ownership) is col-
lected from the definitive merger proxy statements and reflects the voting rights (in some
cases, shareholders may own only the cash flow rights of the shares) of different parties in the
newly merged firm at the time of the acquisition completion.
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with the evidence that, on one hand, SPACs may be used as an exit strategy
of the target owners and, on the other hand, they may be used by targets as a
strategy to get access to the U.S. public market, through a reverse merger.285
The primary holders of SPAC shares–institutional investors (typically repre-
sented by hedge funds)–have an average (median) ownership stake of about 29%
(27%) in the new merged entity. At a first sight, these levels seem to be below
the average institutional ownership level of 51.6% for all publicly traded stocks
as reported by Gompers and Metrick (2001). However, making any comparisons290
of the size of institutional ownership is difficult, given that my sample is in the
bottom of the NYSE size deciles.
While underwriters are generally attracted to SPACs because of the under-
writing compensation in connection with the proposed offering, the SPAC IPO
underwriters in 47% of the deals are also the company’s acquisition advisers.12295
Furthermore, in approximately 66% of the SPAC IPO contracts, a portion of the
underwriter’s compensation is deferred and paid only upon a successful merger
completion.13 This evidence is suggestive of the strong incentives of underwrit-
ers to assist the SPAC during the acquisition process, to successfully complete a
business combination and collect their deferred underwriting fees, as underwrit-300
ers do not share in the liquidation proceeds if a deal is not made and the SPAC
is liquidated. I find that the underwriter becomes the company’s acquisition
adviser 63% of the time if part of the underwriting fees is being deferred, but
only 16% of the time if there are no deferred fees.
The time period between the SPAC IPO and the acquisition announcement305
12The underwriters’ interest in SPACs is a reflection not of an outsize fee, but of the
industry’s acceptance of this vehicle as an area of growth in an otherwise declining IPO market
(Heyman, 2007). The SPAC underwriting fee in my sample varies between 3.25% and 10%,
with an average fee of 7.45% for completed acquisitions (7.15% for withdrawn acquisitions),
which is only slightly larger than the standard IPO fee of 7% (Chen and Ritter, 2000).
13The average portion of deferred fees is 42% for completed acquisitions (42% for withdrawn
acquisitions), and the maximum portion that SPACs have deferred is 75% (61% for withdrawn
acquisitions) of the underwriters’ fees.
13
varies significantly. On average, a SPAC takes about 13 months to find a suit-
able target. However, in some cases, the acquisition is announced within three
months of the IPO; in other cases, almost the whole two-year period is needed
to find a target.
Given the requirement that the business acquired must have a market value310
equal to at least 80% of SPAC’s net assets at the time of the acquisition, some
sponsors may deliberately target the 80% threshold to complete an acquisition.
I show that 24% of the deals in the sample, at the time of the acquisition
completion, have a value that is within 10% of the required 80% threshold.14
Table 4 also reports the summary statistics of all withdrawn acquisitions.315
The relative size of the target firm is significantly larger for the sample of com-
pleted acquisitions versus withdrawn acquisitions. Further, acquisitions that
are later withdrawn take longer from the time of the IPO to be announced, and
they are more likely to have deferred underwriting fees. Although withdrawn
acquisitions are more likely to have deferred underwriting fees, the underwriters320
are less likely to become acquisition advisers for failed SPAC acquisitions.
4. Performance results
In this section, I examine the performance of SPACs in my sample. I study
both stock market performance and accounting performance. In each case,
determining the appropriate benchmark is important. I begin by comparing325
14I examine these deals in more detail by reading the information provided in the definitive
proxy statement on whether the potential target satisfies the required 80% test. For these
deals, one of the of the following holds: The sponsors do not look for a fairness opinion from an
independent source when valuing the target; the sponsors use the services of an independent
source at the time of the acquisition announcement but do not update the information at the
time of the merger completion (the market valuation of the target will very likely change for
the period from the acquisitions announcement to the acquisition completion date); or the
sponsors state that the deal value does not satisfy the 80% test but ask shareholders to vote
for the acquisition approval. In other words, although the 80% test was not satisfied, these
deals were approved.
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the stock price performance of companies in my sample with a measure of the
overall stock market, using the return on the Russell 2000 index as a benchmark.
I then report results using industry- and size-matched firms. Further, I test the
robustness of my results by comparing the performance of SPACs with the
performance of all companies that go public in the same year as the SPAC IPO.330
I examine SPACs’ trading behavior over their lifespan and their performance at
the time of the acquisition announcement, as well as in the long run, up to five
years following their IPO.
4.1. Stock returns at the acquisition announcement
I measure the market reaction to SPAC-related acquisitions by calculating335
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a three-day event window around
the acquisition announcement date. CARs measure the effects on shareholder
value of an acquisition, as assessed by the market, relative to prior expectations.
Hence, a positive CAR does not necessarily indicate that the acquisition was a
good one. SPAC deals may still be value-destroying, but not as value-destroying340
as the market expected. The univariate results are reported in Table 5. Upon
the acquisition announcement, SPACs exhibit a statistically significant average
CAR of 1.5%, for the sample of completed acquisitions. I next examine the
subsample of withdrawn acquisitions and find that the market reaction to these
deals is insignificantly different from zero. CARs of completed deals are, on345
average, 1.4% higher relative to the CARs of withdrawn deals, although the
difference is not statistically significant. The market reaction to all 118 acquisi-
tions shows an average CAR of 1%. This result is consistent with the findings of
Tran (2010) that SPAC acquirers make better acquisitions than public acquirers
with an average three-day CAR of 1.7% compared with the CAR of 0.33% of350
other public bidders. The result is also consistent with the findings in the liter-
ature on acquisitions of private companies that bidder shareholders gain when
buying a private firm or a subsidiary but lose when purchasing a public firm
(see Chang, 1998; and Fuller et al., 2002).
[Insert Table 5 near here]355
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One may argue that SPAC acquisitions should also be compared with reverse
mergers involving shell companies, a deal structure related to but at the same
time distinct from SPACs. While the SPAC is a public shell company set up to
raise money via an IPO with the intent to purchase a private company within
a specified time period, a traditional reverse merger involves two preexisting360
companies (without the institutional details of SPACs), in which a private com-
pany acquires a public shell. Another difference is that a SPAC, in contrast to
a reverse merger, provides substantial cash infusion and guidance to the private
firm through a knowledgeable management team. Floros and Sapp (2011) show
that, while the average SPAC reverse merger has a positive 2.55% 11-day CAR365
around the acquisition announcement, the corresponding 28.94% average CAR
of a shell company in a traditional reverse merger is much greater.
4.2. Trust values and trading behavior of SPACs
Table 6 reports the average premium or discount between the common stock
price and the pro rata trust value of SPACs at different times during their life.370
Average premiums are calculated using the closing price on each respective date
(First day of equity trading, Announcement date, Shareholder vote date, and
Acquisition completion date). The trust value is estimated assuming a constant
rate of growth of the money invested in the trust from the IPO to the vote date.
Following Jenkinson and Sousa (2011), the SPACs that completed an acquisition375
are split according to whether the share price at the vote date is above or below
the trust value, as Good and Bad acquisitions, respectively. Further, the first
four columns of Table 6 present summary statistics for the whole unconditional
sample (all good or all bad acquisitions), and the last four columns report results
only for the conditional sample of acquisitions. The conditional sample contains380
only those completed acquisitions (good or bad) in which the SPAC sponsors
have purchased additional shares in the open market during the period from
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the acquisition announcement to the shareholder vote date.15 I find that while,
on average, Good acquisitions trade at a premium, at least at the Shareholder
vote date and at the Acquisition completion date, Bad acquisitions always trade385
at a discount. The differences in means and medians between good and bad
acquisitions are statistically significant. Moreover, I find that SPAC sponsors
are more likely to buy shares in the open market prior to a bad deal versus a
good one. My results are consistent with the findings of Jenkinson and Sousa
(2011) that SPAC sponsors might be playing an important role in the approval390
of value-destroying acquisitions.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
4.3. Post-acquisition stock performance
Having shown that on average the announcements of acquisitions by SPAC
acquirers are received positively by the market, even though significant cross-395
sectional variation exists in their quality, I next examine the long-run share
price performance of SPAC acquisitions. In Panel A of Table 7, I report the
buy-and-hold stock returns for several sub-periods after the effective date of the
merger and between the merger announcement and the merger effective date,
as well as for the whole period from the merger announcement until a year after400
the acquisition was completed. I find no significant difference in the general
market performance and the performance of the new merged company over the
period between the merger announcement and the merger effective date. The
average return on SPACs is 4.4%, compared with the Russell 2000 index return
of 2.2% for the same period. After the merger completion, however, the average405
performance of the merged company starts to deteriorate dramatically. Mean
and median returns for the new merged company are negative in all subsequent
periods and always significantly less than the market returns. For the 71 firms
15Jenkinson and Sousa (2011) find some evidence that SPAC sponsors of bad acquisitions
are making sure bad deals are being approved by buying shares, just prior to the vote date,
from investors who have indicated that they will vote against the deal.
17
in the sample, the one-year post-merger return data show total mean (median)
returns of -41.0% (-58.9%), compared with the market returns of -1.3% (-5.2%).410
These figures provide strong evidence that investing in SPAC acquisitions has
been harmful to shareholders’ wealth, on average. Moreover, the performance
for the two-year period following the merger completion is even worse, with
an average buy-and-hold return of -56.3% compared with a 1.4% return of the
market.415
[Insert Table 7 near here]
The significant post-merger under-performance of SPAC acquisitions is much
worse compared with the findings of previous literature on the long-term perfor-
mance of mergers. For example, Agrawal et al. (1992) examine 937 U.S. mergers
from 1955 to 1987 and find that mergers are followed by significant abnormal420
returns of -1.5% over a year and -10.3% over a five-year period after the effec-
tive date. In more recent evidence for 12,023 acquisitions from 1980 to 2001,
Moeller et al. (2003) find three-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns of -16% for
the whole sample. In addition, they find that acquirers of private targets are the
worst long-term performers, with three-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns of425
-26.5%. SPACs performance is also worse relative to the performance of reverse
mergers involving other blank-check companies. For instance, Lee et al. (2014)
compare Chinese reverse mergers with U.S. reverse mergers and find that, on
average, the former earn 32% (13%) market adjusted buy-and-hold returns one
year (two years) following the merger; the latter, 5% (-7%).430
Panel B of Table 7 provides further evidence on the long-run stock price
performance of firms in my sample using an alternative benchmark constructed
from a sample of matching firms. The sample consists of firms in the same
industry [four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code] closest in size
to the SPAC merged company. As illustrated in the table, the firms in the435
sample also under-perform the industry benchmark by a large margin: SPAC
acquisitions one-year average returns are -44.7% versus 19.8% for the matched
firms. Similarly, their performance for the whole period from the merger an-
18
nouncement until a year after the acquisition is completed is significantly worse
than that of their matching counterparts.440
Given that SPACs are viewed as a hybrid between an IPO and a merger
transaction, I compare the performance of SPACs with the post-IPO perfor-
mance of all other companies that have completed an initial public offering in
the same year as the SPAC IPO. The results are reported in Panel C of Table
7. They show that, on average, SPACs are performing significantly worse than445
their IPO counterparts. For example, four years after the SPAC IPO, they have
an average buy-and-hold return of -51.9% compared with 8.5% of other newly
public firms.
I reach the same conclusion when I compare my findings with the findings
of other studies on post-IPO performance. For example, Loughran and Ritter450
(1995) in their sample of 4,082 IPOs, conducted between 1970 and 1990, report
one-year average raw returns of 1.6%, compared with 6.1% of their benchmark.
The IPO-adjusted returns in my sample appear to be similar to those reported
by Brown et al. (2005), who show that roll-up IPOs also under-perform the
market, with an average total return of -7.45%, after two years, compared with455
market returns of 46.93%.
Although the performance of SPACs is substantially worse than that of al-
ternative benchmarks, not all SPAC transactions in my sample perform poorly.
In fact, some of them outperform their benchmarks by large margins. In Section
5, I examine whether the structure of the firm at the time of the acquisition460
announcement is related to the SPAC subsequent performance.
4.4. Post-acquisition operating performance and valuation
In this subsection, I study the operating performance and valuation of SPACs
following an acquisition. Panel A and Panel C of Table 8 contain data on
industry-adjusted, matched firm–adjusted, and IPO firm–adjusted profitability465
one and two years following the acquisition, respectively. I make industry ad-
justments by subtracting the median ratio of all firms that operate in the same
four-digit SIC code, as defined by Compustat. I perform matched firm adjust-
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ments by subtracting the correspondent measures of firms in the same industry
(four-digit SIC code) closest in size to the SPAC merged company. Lastly, the470
IPO firm adjustment is done by subtracting the median ratio of all firms that
performed an IPO in the same year as the SPAC acquisition.16
[Insert Table 8 near here]
I report data on two profitability measures: operating profits divided by
sales and net income divided by sales. The first measure, operating return475
on sales, shows a significant difference in the accounting performance between
SPACs and the various benchmarks used. The second measure, return on sales,
provides further evidence that SPACs have significantly lower post-acquisition
performance relative to other firms in their industry, matched peers, or newly
public firms. The results indicate that one year or two years following the480
acquisition SPACs have not only poor stock price performance, but also poor
operating performance.
Previous literature studying post-acquisition operating performance finds
mixed results. For example, Ghosh (2001), who uses firms matched on pre-
acquisition performance and size as a benchmark, finds no evidence that oper-485
ating performance improves following acquisitions. Healy et al. (1992), using
industry-median firms as a benchmark, conclude that cash flow performance
improves following acquisitions.
Again, comparing the post-acquisition operating performance of SPACs with
the post-IPO performance of companies that have completed an initial public490
offering is useful. Although, consistent with previous studies on IPOs, I find
a significant decline in the operating performance of SPACs following the ac-
16All variables reported in Tables 8 and 9, except the price-to-earnings ratios, are winsorized
at 5%. The results are stronger if I winsorize at 1%. The results remain qualitatively un-
changed if I match firms by size and book-to-market ratios. They are also consistent if I use
alternative measures of profitability such as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization (EBITDA) / total sales, net cash flow / total sales, EBITDA / total assets, and
net cash flow / total assets.
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quisition, I also find that their performance is significantly worse than that of
traditional IPOs (see Jain and Kini, 1994; and Mikkelson et al., 1997).
When examining the operating performance of SPAC acquisitions, their cap-495
ital structure also should be taken into consideration. SPAC acquisitions could
be more levered and have higher financial distress costs, which affects their op-
erating performance. In Panel B and Panel D of Table 8, I report the industry-,
matched firm–, and IPO firm–adjusted ratio of long-term debt to assets, cash
to assets, and net long-term debt to assets one year and two years following500
the acquisition, respectively. The results suggest that firms in my sample do
have a higher level of leverage relative to the median firm in their industries
and the median firm that became public in the same year. Nevertheless, SPAC
acquisitions appear to have significantly larger cash holdings compared with
the median industry and IPO firm. When I take into account the level of cash505
that each company holds, I find that SPAC acquisitions are as levered as their
counterparts. Only when compared with other IPO firms do SPAC acquisitions
appear to have a higher, and statistically significant, average net long-term debt
to assets ratio. Moreover, the results in Panel D of Table 8 show that in the long
run SPACs increase their debt level and that, two years after the acquisition,510
SPACs deals are more levered compared with their matched counterparts.
Given that SPACs are relatively new financial vehicles, investors might not
understand all the risks involved with investment in such funds or their belief
in the expertise of SPAC founders could be too high, or both. I thus examine
whether the initial valuations of SPAC acquisitions imply high anticipated profit515
growth relative to other firms in the industry. For this purpose, I compute the
Tobin’s Q, earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio, and price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.
Panel A of Table 9 reports statistics on industry-adjusted, matched firm–
adjusted, and IPO firm–adjusted firm valuation ratios one year after the acquisi-
tion was completed. The Tobin’s Q ratio of the SPACs is either not significantly520
different or significantly lower than that of the alternative benchmarks. How-
ever, their E/P ratio in the first year after the merger is significantly below all
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benchmarks.17 The finding suggests that SPAC valuations were not higher than
those of various benchmarks. However, comparing the anticipated profit growth
of SPACs at the time of the merger completion, instead of a year later, might525
be useful. Therefore, in Panel B of Table 9, I report the firm valuation ratios of
SPACs at the time of the merger. Although the results are weak, they give some
indication that at least initially SPAC acquisitions were valued higher relative
to some benchmarks and relative to their own valuations a year later.
[Insert Table 9 near here]530
In summary, the findings from this section imply that SPACs’ accounting
performance in the year following the acquisition is worse than that of their
industry peers. In addition, SPACs do not seem to be more levered and, at
least initially, investors had higher valuations of SPACs and were expecting
them to perform better.535
5. Cross-sectional determinants of stock returns
So far, I have shown that although the announcements of SPAC acquisitions
are received positively by the market, SPACs, in aggregate, deliver poor stock
returns in the years following the acquisition. In this section, I examine the
deal- and firm-specific characteristics that help determine whether particular540
SPAC acquisitions are successful or not. For a dependent variable, I first use
the IPO-adjusted buy-and-hold return earned by SPACs over a four-year period
following the SPAC IPO date. I then study the short-run performance, mea-
sured by the three-day event window cumulative abnormal return around the
acquisition announcement date. I seek to explain the cross-sectional variation545
in performance by focusing on factors related to the conflicts of interest between
various parties involved in the SPAC acquisition, corporate governance of the
merged firms, and other deal characteristics.
17Given that 60% of the E/P ratios of the sample have negative values, I also report the
P/E ratios only for the firms with positive earnings.
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The time from the IPO to the acquisition announcement may have an impact
on SPAC returns. SPACs have a maximum of two years from the time of their550
IPO to acquire another company or otherwise they have to liquidate and return
the money to the investors. Knowing that they have to close an acquisition to
collect their compensation, and being pressured under the two-year time con-
straints, SPAC founders might be encouraged to make unsuitable acquisitions.
SPAC performance may vary depending on how much time it takes for a SPAC555
to find the right target. SPAC deals that are announced closer to the deadline
of an acquisition completion might be perceived positively or negatively by the
market. On one hand, SPACs that take a longer time to announce an acqui-
sition are potentially putting more effort and time in finding the best suitable
target and conducting thorough due diligence. This could be reflected in a pos-560
itive performance. On the other hand, deals announced by SPACs close to the
acquisition deadline may be seen as last-minute opportunistic deals and may
receive a negative market reaction. For instance, Axelson et al. (2009) argue
that PE fund managers have a strong incentive to overpay for transactions oc-
curring toward the end of the fund’s investment period as they prefer to spend565
all of the capital committed before losing it at the end of the fixed investment
period (which is usually five years).
The continued involvement of the SPAC IPO underwriters in the follow-
up acquisition process of the company may also affect the SPAC performance.
Given that part of the underwriting fees is deferred and paid to the underwrit-570
ers only upon acquisition completion, the underwriters have an incentive to get
involved in the merger process and influence the purchase decision of the SPAC
managers. For example, by becoming acquisition advisers to the SPAC, un-
derwriters may follow their own private interests and recommend any possible
unsuitable target to close a deal and collect their deferred fees in addition to575
their merger advisory fees.18 Therefore, I investigate how SPAC performance
18Lewellen (2009) reports that deferred underwriting compensation in SPAC IPOs have
increased dramatically over time, from 0% in 2003 to an average of 3.8% of gross average
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varies when a portion of the underwriter’s compensation is deferred and paid
only upon the merger completion and when the SPAC acquisition adviser is the
same as its IPO underwriter. In addition, I study how performance is affected
when the IPO underwriter becomes the SPAC acquisition adviser, conditional580
on there being deferred underwriting fees.
One of the requirements of the SPAC contract stated in the IPO prospectus
is that the initial target business that the SPAC acquires must have a fair
market value equal to at least 80% of the SPAC’s net assets at the time of the
acquisition. The rationale behind this rule is that the money is raised for the585
purpose of making an acquisition, not to provide the SPAC with proceeds for
general corporate purposes or to turn it into an investment fund. However, this
requirement may also give SPAC sponsors the wrong incentive to overpay for
the target. In other words, the sponsors may use this 80% as an anchor in
their decision when they evaluate potential targets and not necessarily consider590
what is best for the interests of outside shareholders. They may find it more
convenient to overpay for a smaller target, instead of bidding for the acquisition
of a large target and diluting their ownership. I test whether SPAC performance
differs for acquisitions whose value is within 10% of the required 80% threshold
(80% of the SPAC’s net assets) at the time of the acquisition completion.595
Sponsor ownership could also affect performance. The effect of a high level
of SPAC sponsor ownership on corporate performance could be positive or nega-
tive. The positive effect stems from the enhancement in firm value, as increased
managerial ownership decreases agency costs of equity by reducing managers’
consumption of perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, as Jenk-600
inson and Sousa (2011) show, the enormous incentives of SPAC sponsors to
complete any kind of deal may encourage the SPAC management teams and
related parties to purchase large blocks of stock on the open market just prior
to the shareholder vote on a proposed acquisition. Jenkinson and Sousa inter-
pret this behavior as evidence that SPAC sponsors are buying shares from likely605
proceeds in 2008.
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“no” voters and are approving acquisitions to receive their promised 20% eq-
uity compensation.19 Given that the approved acquisitions are not necessarily
the optimal choice, increasing sponsor ownership may have a negative effect on
performance.20 I also investigate whether SPAC performance is related to the
level of board control exercised by the sponsors. For instance, Guo et al. (2011)610
find that gains in operating performance of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), one of
the most important types of private equity investments, are higher for deals in
which the CEO is replaced during buyout completion. Similarly, Cornelli and
Karakas¸ (2013) find that higher levels of PE sponsor involvement in the target
company ultimately leads to better performance. I examine three aspects of615
board control: (1) whether one of the sponsors provides the CEO, (2) whether
one of the sponsors becomes the chairman of the board, and (3) whether the
CEO is also the chairman of the board and is one of the sponsors.
The involvement of the target insiders in the management of the newly
merged company may also affect performance. Again, arguments can be de-620
veloped to support both positive and negative effects. If the target insiders
19I review Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G, as well as Form 13F, and find that in more
than 50% of the deals in my sample the sponsors report that they buy additional shares
prior to the Special Meeting of Stockholders, held to consider and vote upon the proposed
merger. Furthermore, in 29 deals, the sponsors enter into an agreement with Victory Park
Capital Advisors, LLC, pursuant to which funds managed by Victory Park, or other purchasers
acceptable to Victory Park and the sponsors, will use their reasonable best efforts to purchase
up to an agreed amount of SPAC shares from third parties prior to the Special Meeting of
Stockholders.
20In fact, in 2010 the SEC has proposed amendments to Rule 10b-18 under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10b-18 provides issuers with a safe harbor from liability for
manipulation when they repurchase their common stock in the market in accordance with the
rule’s manner, timing, price, and volume conditions. Because the SEC recognizes the strong
incentives of SPAC sponsors to make substantial purchases of their stock solely to ensure
that they receive a favorable stockholder vote on the proposed acquisition, the agency has
proposed excluding SPACs from the safe harbor (from the time of the public announcement
of the transaction until the earlier of the completion of the transaction or the vote by both
the target shareholders and SPAC shareholders).
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receive proper incentives to maximize the value of the new firm, their continued
involvement could prove to be beneficial because they have substantial inside
knowledge of the target and the industry. For instance, in many cases, target
insiders are also the founders of the target company and, as pointed out by625
Schwert (1985), the founder is probably the most important asset of the firm at
least in the early stages of the company’s life. Conversely, higher target insider
ownership in the merged company may be an indication that the SPAC spon-
sors overpaid for the acquisition. The target management and owners are well
aware of the fact that sponsors must spend at least 80% of the SPAC money630
on the purchase, within the limited time of two years. Consequently, they may
use their bargaining power and extract a higher price for target shareholders.
In addition, I examine whether the continued involvement of target insiders has
an effect on SPAC performance by introducing three new variables: (1) whether
one of the target insiders provides the CEO, (2) whether one of the target in-635
siders becomes the chairman of the board, and (3) whether the CEO is also the
chairman of the board and is one of the target insiders.
The previous literature also underlines the role of institutional blockholders’
monitoring as an important corporate governance mechanism. I investigate
whether the level of institutional ownership in the merged firm is reflected in640
better performance of SPAC acquisitions.21 I also control for two alternative
measures of corporate governance: the fraction of independent directors on the
board of directors and the CEO incentives measured by the number of stock
options awarded to the CEO of the newly merged company. As the majority
of the targets in the sample are private companies, and acquisitions of private645
targets have been found to differ from acquisitions of public companies, I include
an additional control variable: Private target (see Officer, 2007). I also control
for the SPAC size (SPAC market capitalization), relative size (Relative size),
medium of exchange (Cash deal), deal value (Deal value), and industry merger
21I introduce two alternative measures: the fraction of the firm held by institutional block-
holders and the number of outside blockholders owning 5% or more shares.
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activity (Target’s liquidity index ), as these variables have been found to have an650
effect on acquisition performance (see Moeller et al., 2004, 2007; Travos, 1987;
and Schlingemann et al., 2002).22
Table 10 contains the results of the regression analyses. The dependent
variable in all specifications is the four-year post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal
return, adjusted for the return on all other firms that became public in the655
same year as the SPAC IPO. Model (1) shows the effect of the time from IPO
to the acquisition announcement variable, as well as the effect of deferred IPO
underwriter fees, controlling for ownership, governance, deal, and SPAC charac-
teristics.23 In model (2), I introduce a dummy of SPAC underwriter being also
the SPAC acquisition adviser and an interaction dummy that captures the effect660
of a SPAC underwriter becoming an acquisition adviser, conditional on there
being deferred underwriting fees. In the following models, I include a dummy
that reflects whether the value of the target at the time of the acquisition was
within 10% of the required 80% threshold of the SPAC’s net asset value. In some
specifications, I include industry fixed effects as additional control variables.665
[Insert Table 10 near here]
I find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the time it
takes for SPAC sponsors to find a potential target and SPAC performance. In
other words, the longer it takes for the SPAC to announce an acquisition, the
22Skewed variables, such as SPAC market capitalization and Deal value, are transformed
using natural log transformation. Results are consistent if started-log transformation is used
instead. It is important to also control for deal characteristics (whether the deal was a tender
offer or hostile, or whether there were multiple bidders) when examining the short- and long-
term performance of SPAC acquisitions. However, after further analysis, I find that there
is only one tender offer in the whole sample and all of the deals involve friendly mergers.
Moreover, no evidence exists of multiple bidders, which is not surprising given that most
of the deals involve private targets (deals usually done through private negotiations, versus
public auctions, which is the case for public targets).
23Because CEO duality from sponsor (CEO duality from target insider) is highly correlated
with CEO is a sponsor (CEO is a target insider), I include only one at a time.
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higher are the stock returns, as the sponsors are potentially putting in more670
time to conduct thorough due diligence and purchase the most suitable target.
However, acquisitions that are announced too quickly or too late are perceived
by the market as less valuable and have worse performance. Given the strong
incentive of sponsors to buy a target, they can either purchase a target as soon
as possible after the SPAC IPO or make a last-minute acquisition under the675
pressure of the approaching two-year deadline date. My results are economically
significant. The four-year post-IPO buy-and-hold abnormal return is on average
(across various specifications) 8.8% lower if the acquisition is announced at the
end of the two-year deadline instead of at the optimal time. The results are
consistent with the go-for-broke hypothesis of Axelson et al. (2009) and with680
the findings of Degeorge et al. (2013) that secondary buyouts (SBOs) made late
in the investment period under-perform other SBOs.
The coefficient estimates on the Deferred fees and Underwriter is adviser
variables are both negative and statistically significant. A possible interpreta-
tion of the less favorable performance of these acquisitions is that the deferred685
underwriter fees may create the wrong incentives for the IPO underwriters.
SPAC underwriters, who have not collected the full amount of their fees, can
get involved in the merger process following their own private interests that
may not necessarily be aligned with the interests of the SPAC shareholders and
push for any potential deal. Moreover, the Background of the Merger section690
in the DEFM 14A statements shows that, in fact, it is not uncommon that the
underwriter as adviser is the one who finds the potential target and introduces it
to the SPAC sponsors. My results suggest that buy-and-hold abnormal returns
are, on average, 47.9 percentage points lower for SPACs when part of the com-
pensation of the IPO underwriter is deferred and paid upon successful merger695
completion. When I add the interaction dummy that captures the effect of a
SPAC underwriter becoming an acquisition adviser, conditional on there being
deferred underwriting fees, I find the opposite effect.
While SPAC performance appears to be independent of the 80% deal and
target ownership variables, I find some evidence that the continued involvement700
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of SPAC sponsors as shareholders and board members has an impact on the
long-term performance of SPAC acquisitions. Higher sponsor ownership leads
to worse SPAC performance. Sponsors may be approving value-destroying ac-
quisitions, to obtain their compensation, by buying additional shares in the
open market. Further, deals in which the sponsors ended up holding a sig-705
nificant portion of the newly merged company may also reflect deals in which
the sponsors bought smaller targets (but not necessarily more valuable targets)
because they did not want to issue more shares and dilute their ownership.
Sponsors’ board representation, meanwhile, seems to have a positive effect on
performance. The long-run returns are at least 57 percentage points higher after710
adjusting for industry movements, if one of the SPAC sponsors is appointed as
a chairman of the merged company. These findings underline the importance
of continuing sponsor involvement. While their expertise may matter during
the search for a suitable target and the execution of the acquisition, the results
suggest that sponsors may add value by monitoring the newly merged company,715
at least initially after the acquisition. My findings are consistent with previous
literature that shows the importance of individuals’ superior characteristics for
firm performance and with the PE literature that finds monitoring advice and
involvement of PE sponsors to be even more effective than CEO turnover or
separation of CEO and chairman of the board in improving performance of the720
target company (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2012; Cornelli
and Karakas¸, 2013; and Weir et al., 2005a).
Lastly, some regression models show that the ownership of the institutional
blockholders has a negative effect on performance. These results are in contrast
with the findings of Tran (2010). He examines the acquisition discount obtained725
by SPAC bidders at the time of the acquisition and finds that the higher the
level of independent long-term institutional blockholders, the larger is the dis-
count.24 His interpretation is that institutional blockholders act as a monitoring
24It is important to highlight the differences between my and Tran’s identification tech-
niques. First, Tran (2010) examines the effect of institutional ownership on the acquisition
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device and potentially mitigate the perverse incentives of the sponsors to make
unsuitable acquisitions. I, however, find that institutional ownership has a neg-730
ative and significant effect on the long-term stock performance. The long-run
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are on average between 8.3 and 9.6 percentage
points lower, for every 10% increase in institutional ownership, depending on
the specification used. In the last column of Table 10, I divide the institutional
ownership in two separate variables: the ownership of the original institutions,735
which bought shares at the time of the IPO, and the ownership of the new in-
stitutional holders, which bought at the merger completion or between the IPO
and the merger completion. The coefficient estimates on both variables remain
negative. However, both are statistically insignificant.
Institutional investors in SPAC acquisitions typically are represented by740
hedge funds. Unfortunately, the lack of disclosure limits the quantitative data
available on hedge funds and constrains my empirical investigation. In an at-
tempt to shed some light on the interests of institutional investors in SPAC
transactions, I examine what their intentions are based on the information re-
ported in Item 4 of Schedule 13D. For instance, Brav et al. (2008) argue that745
hedge funds are better positioned to act as informed monitors than other institu-
tional investors, because they are subject to less regulation and their managers
have few conflicts of interest. In addition, according to their findings, hedge
fund activists are not short term in focus, as some critics have claimed, and,
based on their sample, the holding period of hedge funds is closer to 20 months.750
However, after reading Schedule 13D filed with the SEC, I do not find evi-
dence that hedge funds’ interest is to force changes or seek control at SPACs.
The information in Item 4 of Schedule 13D, which requires the filer to declare
discount, while I consider the effect of institutional ownership on the long-term stock per-
formance of SPAC acquisitions. Second, he studies only the effect of independent long-term
institutional blockholdings, obtained one quarter before the merger announcement, while I
examine the effect of total institutional ownership, measured at the time of the acquisition
completion.
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its reasons for acquiring the shares, suggests that in a majority of the cases
institutional investors acquired shares for investment reasons only.25 Further,755
I find that institutional investors in SPACs are invested for a short period of
time. Initial investors owned on average 29% at the time of the IPO, 20% at
the time of the merger completion, and only 13% one year after the merger was
completed. These results suggest that the initial investors are mainly interested
in short-term investment. In other words, the negative effect of institutional760
ownership on the long-term performance could be explained by the downward
pressure that the exit of hedge funds has on price. My results are consistent
with the findings of Mitchell and Pulvino (2012) that during the financial crisis
of 2007–2009, when debt financing was pulled from arbitrage hedge funds and
the substantial uncertainty in the market led to a significant increase in investor765
redemptions, hedge funds were forced to liquidate their existing positions.
In Table 11, I continue my analysis by estimating similar regressions to
those reported in Table 10 but replace the dependent variable with the three-
day event window CAR measured around the acquisition announcement date,
using Russell 2000 index as a market proxy. Columns 1 to 6 report results only770
for the sample of completed acquisitions, and column 7 shows results for the
whole sample (completed and withdrawn acquisitions). Overall, the results are
similar to my previous findings, with a few exceptions.26 I now find that SPAC
acquisitions that have a market value very close to the required 80% threshold
have worse performance. CAR is on average 6.3 percentage points lower if the775
deal is close to the 80% threshold. Although these deals are satisfying the 80%
test, the market seems to perceive them as lower quality acquisitions. SPAC
sponsors, aware of the 80% requirement necessary for the acquisition approval,
could be given the wrong incentives to deviate from their optimal choice, overpay
25In fact, some hedge fund investors report that they have bought shares in the SPAC
acquisition to benefit from event-, risk-, or merger-arbitrage strategies.
26The results remain qualitatively unchanged when I include year fixed effects in the regres-
sions.
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for a smaller target, complete an acquisition, and collect their compensation.780
Further, in these new regressions, I find that the coefficient estimates of the
Underwriter is adviser variable and of the interaction dummy that captures
the effect of a SPAC underwriter becoming an adviser, conditional on there
being deferred fees, are no longer statistically significant. In other words, what
appears to drive the results is whether a part of the fees of the IPO underwriters785
is being deferred and paid conditional on a merger completion.
[Insert Table 11 near here]
Overall, the findings reported in Tables 10 and 11 indicate that important
cross-sectional differences exist in the long-run stock performance, as well as
in the short-run stock performance around the acquisition announcement of790
SPACs in my sample. If SPAC sponsors take a long time to find a target or a
portion of the IPO underwriting fees is being deferred and paid conditionally
on a successful merger completion, then the firms under-perform following the
acquisition announcement. The market reaction is also significantly negative for
acquisitions that have a market value very close to the required 80% threshold.795
Further, too high ownership retention by sponsors can be detrimental for the
long-term performance of the merged company. These results show that the
perverse incentives of sponsors may wrongly incentivize them to buy unsuitable
targets. SPACs that appoint a sponsor as a chairman, however, perform better,
consistent with the valuable expertise and the importance of continuing, to a800
certain extent, sponsor involvement.
6. Concluding remarks
The special purpose acquisition company is a financial innovation whose
unique public form of the private equity contract allows more light to be shed on
the classic financial contract between private equity investor and the manager.805
In this paper, I study how the traditional private equity mechanisms included
in the SPAC contract, most notably the incentive-based compensation of man-
agers, the time limit on managers’ use of funds, and the limits on the amount
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managers can invest, affect the performance of SPACs. I study the stock price
reaction to SPAC acquisitions at the time of the acquisition announcement, as810
well as their long-term stock and accounting performance.
While the announcements of acquisitions by SPAC acquirers are received
positively by the market, on average these acquisitions under-perform in the
long run. The results of the accounting performance of SPACs also suggest that
they significantly under-perform their various benchmarks. Further, while SPAC815
acquisitions do not appear to be more levered, they do fall short of investors’
expectations given that they are sold and initially trade at higher valuations
relative to their peers.
Substantial cross-sectional variation exists in SPAC performance. I docu-
ment that the perverse incentives embedded in the SPAC contract may encour-820
age some SPAC sponsors and underwriters to make bad acquisitions to collect
their equity compensation and defer underwriting fees, respectively. I also find
that the continued involvement of SPAC sponsors as shareholders and board
members in the new company influences future performance.
Given the recent trend in the PE industry toward alternative, more flexible825
structures of fund-raising, the popularity of SPAC transactions is likely to re-
main. However, the evidence of this paper suggests that as long as alternative
deal-by-deal structures are not better at aligning the interests of managers and
investors, they will not fix the problems of the PE industry.
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Figure 1:
Volume of SPACs and traditional IPOs.
Panel A shows the total number of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), traditional
initial public offerings (IPOs), and public equity (PE) funds in the U.S. from 2003 to 2014.
Panel B shows the dollar value of all SPACs, traditional IPOs, and PE fund-raising in the
U.S. from 2003 to 2014.
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Figure 2:
The evolution of private equity fund structure.
This figure shows the percentage of alternative structures of private equity (if not a limited
partnership) that general partners expect to see an increase in over the next three years.
The source of the data is Grant Thornton’s Global Private Equity Report 2013/2014, which
is compiled from 156 in-depth interviews with senior private equity practitioners around the
globe.
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Table 2.
Summary statistics: Distribution of special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) initial public
offerings (IPOs) and merger and acquisition transactions.
SPACs that completed an acquisition SPACs that were liquidated
Year Number of IPOs Number of acquisitions Number of IPOs Number of acquisitions
2003 1 – – –
2004 7 1 1 –
2005 24 1 5 –
2006 10 8 13 –
2007 25 25 25 –
2008 6 15 2 –
2009 – 16 – –
2010 – 7 – –
Total 73 73 46 –
43
Table 3.
Summary statistics: Industry classification.
Target industry Frequency
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas [Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 13] 3
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries (SIC 27) 3
Electronic, Electrical Equipment, and Components, Except Computer Equipment (SIC 36) 3
Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight (SIC 44) 3
Communications (SIC 48) 5
Holding, and Other Investment Offices (SIC 67) 6
Business Services (SIC 73) 15
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services (SIC 87) 5
Other Industries (N=27 ) 30
Total 73
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Table 5.
Short-term stock performance of special purpose acquisition companies around acquisition
announcements.
The table reports cumulative abnormal returns, measured over a three-day event window
around the acquisition announcement date. The benchmark is the Russell 2000 index. The
results of t-tests of differences in means and nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank tests of
differences in medians are reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Announcement return Mean Median Std. Dev. N
Panel A: Completed acquisitions
All 0.015*** 0.004 0.059 72
Cash 0.026 0.014 0.068 13
Stock -0.005 -0.005 0.038 15
Mixed 0.021** 0.004 0.062 44
Panel B: Withdrawn acquisitions
All 0.001 -0.001 0.034 46
Cash 0.003 0.004 0.025 7
Stock 0.002 0.001 0.027 5
Mixed 0.001 -0.009 0.037 34
Panel C: All acquisitions
All 0.010** 0.001 0.048 118
Cash 0.015 0.009 0.048 20
Stock -0.003 -0.002 0.034 20
Mixed 0.011** -0.000 0.051 78
Panel D: Completed less withdrawn
All 0.014 0.005
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Table 10.
Cross-sectional regression of long-term stock performance of SPACs.
The dependent variable is the initial public offering (IPO)–adjusted buy-and-hold return
earned by special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) over a four-year period following
the SPAC IPO date. All explanatory variables are described in the Appendix. Deal value is
transformed using started-log transformation. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) standard
errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time to acquisition 2.771* 3.473** 3.667*** 4.043*** 3.166** 3.015* 3.499**
(1.74) (2.17) (2.36) (2.48) (2.07) (1.93) (2.16)
Time to acquisition2 -0.238* -0.301** -0.316** -0.350*** -0.267* -0.254* -0.302**
(-1.70) (-2.04) (-2.21) (-2.34) (-1.90) (-1.77) (-2.01)
Deferred fees -0.331** -0.501*** -0.499*** -0.526*** -0.551*** -0.472*** -0.471***
(-2.15) (-2.53) (-2.67) (-2.66) (-2.95) (-2.41) (-2.49)
Underwriter is adviser -0.679** -0.762*** -0.641** -0.706*** -0.566* -0.752***
(-2.26) (-2.66) (-2.01) (-2.49) (-1.90) (-2.68)
Defer. fees*Under. is adviser 0.685** 0.744*** 0.635* 0.750*** 0.613* 0.779***
(1.98) (2.40) (1.83) (2.47) (1.86) (2.60)
80% deal 0.359 0.325 0.374 0.377 0.447
(1.42) (1.17) (1.51) (1.45) (1.68)
Ownership of sponsors 0.851 3.894 1.280 4.226 3.624 4.006 3.071
(0.29) (1.17) (0.45) (1.26) (1.22) (1.30) (1.08)
Ownership of sponsors2 -8.021 -17.599 -9.936 -19.323* -18.551* -19.538** -15.991
(-0.81) (-1.57) (-1.03) (-1.70) (-1.83) (-1.96) (-1.67)
Ownership of target insiders -0.814 -0.066 -0.694 -0.066 -0.718 -1.109 -1.291
(-0.82) (-0.06) (-0.69) (-0.06) (-0.69) (-1.06) (-1.22)
Ownership of target insiders2 0.768 0.120 0.527 -0.064 0.471 0.989 1.018
(0.55) (0.08) (0.38) (-0.04) (0.34) (0.69) (0.73)
Chairman is a sponsor 0.597*** 0.571*** 0.616*** 0.570** 0.678***
(2.54) (2.45) (2.59) (2.19) (2.91)
Chairman is a target insider 0.417* 0.250 0.188 0.283 0.272
(1.90) (1.13) (0.61) (1.25) (1.25)
CEO is a sponsor 0.105 0.268 0.468
(0.30) (0.80) (1.36)
CEO is a target insider 0.132 0.269 0.551*
(0.42) (0.89) (1.74)
CEO duality from sponsor 0.291 0.273 0.213
(1.21) (1.05) (1.04)
CEO duality from target insider -0.006 -0.005 0.148
(-0.04) (-0.03) (0.52)
Ownership of old institutions -0.652
(-1.13)
Ownership of new institutions -0.461
(-1.06)
Ownership of institutions -0.825** -0.603 -0.964*** -0.698
(-2.15) (-1.39) (-2.60) (-1.58)
Cash deal 0.181 0.075 0.089 0.096 0.028 0.087 0.009
(0.89) (0.33) (0.45) (0.42) (0.14) (0.39) (0.05)
Private target -0.257* -0.282* -0.285** -0.292* -0.297** -0.330** -0.392***
(-1.75) (-1.69) (-1.98) (-1.77) (-1.98) (-2.06) (-2.46)
(Continue)
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Table 10 – Continued
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relative size 0.094 0.091 -0.040 -0.002 -0.092 -0.118 -0.099
(0.58) (0.43) (-0.23) (-0.01) (-0.54) (-0.51) (-0.58)
SPAC market capitalization -0.025 0.048 -0.396 -0.260 -0.470 -0.530 -0.537
(-0.09) (0.14) (-1.04) (-0.55) (-1.27) (-1.17) (-1.44)
Deal value 0.010 -0.062 0.415 0.253 0.503 0.509 0.538
(0.04) (-0.17) (1.05) (0.50) (1.30) (1.06) (1.39)
Target’s liquidity index 1.512 2.738** 1.398 2.649** 1.915** 2.390* 1.543
(1.56) (2.15) (1.49) (2.10) (1.95) (1.93) (1.67)
N of CEO’s stock options -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.52) (-1.01) (-0.46) (-0.93) (-0.98)
N of outside blockholders -0.082*** -0.091*** -0.050
(-2.33) (-2.42) (-0.97)
% of independent directors 0.470 0.521 0.764**
(1.52) (1.58) (2.26)
Constant -8.659** -9.782** -11.137*** -11.367** -10.026*** -9.026** -10.924***
(-1.95) (-2.20) (-2.56) (-2.50) (-2.35) (-2.09) (-2.48)
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Adj. R2 0.279 0.268 0.354 0.285 0.383 0.368 0.400
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No
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Table 11.
Cross-sectional regression of short-term stock performance of SPACs.
The dependent variable is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return earned by special
purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) over a three-day event window around the acquisition
announcement date. The sample in columns 1 to 6 contains only the successfully completed
SPAC acquisitions; in column 7, all announced acquisitions (completed and uncompleted). All
explanatory variables are described in the Appendix. SPAC market capitalization and Deal
value are transformed using started-log transformation. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White)
standard errors are used in calculation of t-statistics that are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Time to acquisition 0.444*** 0.524*** 0.433*** 0.485*** 0.498*** 0.450*** 0.229*
(2.44) (3.00) (2.60) (2.76) (3.23) (2.88) (1.69)
Time to acquisition2 -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.022*
(-2.45) (-3.06) (-2.67) (-2.88) (-3.34) (-3.02) (-1.72)
Deferred fees -0.059*** -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.061*** -0.056*** -0.043***
(-3.45) (-2.47) (-3.22) (-3.21) (-2.86) (-2.71)
Underwriter is adviser 0.024 0.049 0.063** 0.006
(0.78) (1.67) (2.12) (0.23)
Defer. fees*Under. is adviser -0.033 -0.049 -0.054 -0.001
(-0.97) (-1.57) (-1.66) (-0.04)
80% deal -0.053** -0.054* -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.015
(-1.95) (-1.89) (-2.86) (-2.77) (-0.94)
Ownership of sponsors -0.435 -0.711** -0.677** -0.719** -0.648** -0.630** -0.244
(-1.31) (-2.09) (-2.23) (-2.08) (-2.25) (-2.04) (-1.33)
Ownership of sponsors2 0.748 1.709 1.700* 1.803 1.556 1.523 0.324
(0.69) (1.56) (1.70) (1.58) (1.60) (1.49) (0.72)
Ownership of target insiders -0.103 -0.076 -0.107 -0.095 -0.175* -0.224** -0.046
(-0.89) (-0.67) (-1.01) (-0.84) (-1.73) (-2.07) (-0.56)
Ownership of target insiders2 0.157 0.120 0.180 0.150 0.229 0.236 0.059
(0.95) (0.74) (1.19) (0.94) (1.64) (1.61) (0.50)
Chairman is a sponsor 0.058** 0.052** 0.036 0.039 0.019 0.017 0.041**
(2.14) (1.98) (1.45) (1.43) (0.82) (0.65) (1.96)
Chairman is a target insider 0.048* 0.046* 0.037 0.039 0.024 0.030 0.022
(1.89) (1.89) (1.56) (1.59) (1.08) (1.32) (1.12)
CEO is a sponsor 0.022 -0.003 0.007 -0.015 0.001 -0.015 0.014
(0.54) (-0.08) (0.18) (-0.39) (0.03) (-0.41) (0.51)
CEO is a target insider 0.043 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.026 0.031 0.025
(1.18) (0.28) (0.56) (0.10) (0.85) (0.93) (0.94)
Ownership of institutions 0.010 -0.012 0.024 -0.010 0.012 0.037
(0.22) (-0.25) (0.60) (-0.22) (0.31) (1.19)
Cash deal 0.038* 0.030 0.036* 0.032 0.034* 0.045** 0.014
(1.74) (1.23) (1.81) (1.36) (1.79) (2.11) (0.91)
Private target 0.029* 0.018 0.028* 0.018 0.034*** 0.020 0.016
(1.69) (1.04) (1.80) (1.04) (2.35) (1.27) (1.15)
Relative size -0.003 -0.016 0.006 0.004 0.017 0.016 -0.002
(-0.14) (-0.72) (0.32) (0.15) (0.98) (0.71) (-0.22)
SPAC market capitalization -0.000 0.008 0.065 0.069 0.096*** 0.099** 0.012
(-0.00) (0.20) (1.57) (1.42) (2.49) (2.14) (0.82)
Deal value 0.020 0.031 -0.029 -0.031 -0.059 -0.066 0.002
(0.59) (0.79) (-0.68) (-0.61) (-1.49) (-1.34) (0.15)
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Table 11 – Continued
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Target’s liquidity index 0.104 0.046 0.172
(0.75) (0.49) (1.39)
N of CEO’s stock options -0.001*** -0.001***
(-3.40) (-3.73)
N of outside blockholders -0.006
(-1.63)
% of independent directors 0.022
(0.66)
Constant -1.325*** -1.533*** -1.248*** -1.387*** -1.383*** -1.257*** -0.663*
(-2.63) (-3.21) (-2.67) (-2.86) (-3.21) (-2.91) (-1.78)
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 91
Adj. R2 0.124 0.272 0.320 0.303 0.441 0.471 0.145
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No
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Appendix
This appendix provides a summary of all explanatory variables used in my analysis.
Variable name Variable description
Deal characteristics:
Deal value Natural logarithm of the value of the transaction.
SPAC market capitalization Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the SPAC computed at the
price at the acquisition announcement, measured in millions of dollars.
Relative size Value of the target as a fraction of the market capitalization of the acquirer.
Cash deal Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the medium of exchange is cash
and zero otherwise.
Stock deal Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the medium of exchange is stock
and zero otherwise.
Private target Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the target is a private firm and
zero otherwise.
Target’s liquidity index Ratio of the value of all corporate control transactions reported by SDC for
each year and two-digit SIC code to the total book value of assets of all
Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year.
Time to acquisition Natural logarithm of the number of days between the SPAC IPO and the
acquisition announcement.
Time to acquisition2 Time to acquisition squared.
Deferred fees Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a portion of the IPO’s underwriter
compensation is deferred and paid only upon a successful merger completion
and zero otherwise.
Underwriter is adviser Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a SPAC acquisition adviser is
also the company’s underwriter and zero otherwise.
Defer. fees*Under. is adviser Product of Deferred fees and Underwriter is adviser.
80% deal Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the deal value is worth within
10% of the required 80% threshold (80% of the SPAC’s net assets), at the
time of the acquisition completion, and zero otherwise.
Ownership:
Ownership of sponsors Fraction of the firm held by sponsors immediately after the acquisition.
Ownership of sponsors2 Ownership of sponsors squared.
Ownership of target insiders Fraction of the firm held by target insiders immediately after the acquisition.
Ownership of target insiders2 Ownership of target insiders squared.
Ownership of institutions Fraction of the firm held by institutional blockholders immediately after the
acquisition.
Ownership of old institutions Fraction of the firm held by old institutional blockholders (institutional block-
holders that also held shares prior to the acquisition) immediately after the
acquisition.
Ownership of new institutions Fraction of the firm held by new institutional blockholders (institutional
blockholders that first buy shares at the time of the acquisition announce-
ment) immediately after the acquisition.
Governance:
Directors from sponsors Fraction of sponsors on the board of directors immediately after the acquisi-
tion.
Directors from target insiders Fraction of target insiders on the board of directors immediately after the
acquisition.
(Continue)
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Appendix A.1 – Continued
Variable name Variable description
Board size Number of board members immediately after the acquisition.
Chairman is a sponsor Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the chairman of the newly merged
company is one of the sponsors and zero otherwise.
Chairman is a target insider Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the chairman of the newly merged
company is one of the target insiders and zero otherwise.
CEO is a sponsor Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO of the newly merged
company is one of the sponsors and zero otherwise.
CEO is a target insider Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO of the newly merged
company is one of the target insiders and zero otherwise.
CEO duality from sponsor Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO also holds the position
of the chairman of the board of directors and is one of the sponsors and zero
otherwise.
CEO duality from target in-
sider
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the CEO also holds the position
of the chairman of the board of directors and is one of the target insiders and
zero otherwise.
N of outside blockholders Number of outside blockholders owning 5% or more shares immediately after
the acquisition.
% of independent directors Fraction of independent directors on the board of directors immediately after
the acquisition.
Executive stock option plan Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the newly merged company has
proposed the adoption of an executive stock option plan and zero otherwise.
N of CEO’s stock options Number of stock options awarded to the CEO of the newly merged company.
Accounting measures:
Operating return on sales SPAC’s acquisition operating income divided by total sales.
Return on sales SPAC’s acquisition net income before extraordinary items divided by total
sales.
Long-term debt to assets SPAC’s acquisition ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
Cash to assets SPAC’s acquisition cash and equivalents, divided by total assets.
Net long-term debt to assets SPAC’s acquisition ratio of long-term debt minus cash, divided by total assets.
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